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  Noncontributory subsidies for the old poor (first-pillar pensions) affect the welfare of hundreds of 
millions around the world. Their benevolent rationale is to redistribute progressively, subject to efficiency 
considerations. This paper focuses on a critical efficiency issue: first pillars may affect another, even bigger 
program, namely contributory pensions for the middle classes, by inducing a reduction in the density of 
contributions. A major source of concern with contributory pensions in emerging economies is that the total 
replacement rate is too small for participants with low density, which are prevalent. The paper develops a 
model where density of contribution is endogenous, because for a substantial subset of jobs, the State is 
unable or unwilling to impose a mandate to contribute. Thus, the job selection decision is bundled with a 
saving decision. The first finding is that bundling modifies the effective rate of return on contributions, raising 
it without bound as earnings in uncovered jobs become smaller (relative to earnings in covered jobs). Another 
finding is that the standard designs of first-pillar pensions reduce the equilibrium density of contributions. 
Thus, standard first-pillar designs do crowd out contributory pensions for the middle classes. The paper then 
analyzes two second-generation designs. The “proportional” minimum pension is found to create horizontal 
inequity and inefficiency. In contrast, a subsidy with a small withdrawal rate applied to contributory pensions 
minimizes the loss of contribution density. Optimal income taxation theory suggests that the latter also 
provides the most efficient progressive redistribution. 
                                                 
1 This is the conceptual paper of a pair in which the companion paper discusses the pros and cons of the 2008 
pension reform in Chile. I appreciate comments from Alejandro Micco (Ministry of Finance), Rafael del 
campo (INP Director), Jaime Ruiz-Tagle (Ministry  for the Presidency), Ignacio Irarrázabal and Rosario 
Palacios to a precursor paper, which appeared as Valdés, S. (2007) “Pensión solidaria: ventajas, defectos y 
propuestas”, Temas de la Agenda Pública series Nº 13, December, Santiago de Chile, 
www.puc.cl/agendapublica/ . None is responsible for the claims made in this paper. I also thank the World 
Bank for translating to English a previous version. 
2 Professor of Economics at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, svaldes@faceapuc.cl     2 
1. Introduction 
 
Alleviation of insufficient density of contribution for old-age pensions has paramount 
implications for hundreds of millions of middle-class people around the world. When the 
State is unable or unwilling to provide high density, contributory systems are prevented 
from providing adequate replacement rates. If a substantial share of participants have a low 
density, the contributory systems promoted by the State, either through mandates or fiscal 
incentives, fail to meet their fundamental aim, namely to alleviate (partial) neglect of old 
age. Too many among the middle class may fall into poverty at old age.  
 
Separately, poverty among the old creates a demand on the political system to grant 
progressive subsidies to the old poo, different from subsidies to the poor of any age. These 
are "first-pillar" subsidies. One possible design is a universal flat subsidy for all the old. 
However, this is so expensive fiscally that poor countries have been unable to rely on it. 
 
One way to reduce this fiscal cost is to exclude from benefits those older people that have 
built observable contributory pensions of sufficient size, or those that have an observable 
consumption level financed by other means. This is feasible only if the State can and 
wishes to promote contributory pensions with sufficient coverage and sufficient density of 
contribution, and if the State can measure personal consumption with little error and at a 
modest incremental cost. Under these two conditions, targeting allows both a reduction of 
the fiscal cost and stronger redistribution. 
 
Many States do not meet these stringent conditions. Coverage is limited in South Korea -
only 58% of the labor force contributes- and in Chile - 65% of employment contributes 
each month (World Bank, 2000). Many emerging countries exhibit uneven density of 
contribution, since large groups of self-employed (most of them poor) are exempt from the 
mandate, in addition to women engaged in home production. What can be done in countries 
where some conditions are met, but others are met partially or unevenly? Development 
experts say that “The greatest challenge is to design and manage the link between tax-
financed and contributory social security schemes”(van Ginneken, 2007). 
 
Beyer and Valdés-Prieto (2004) were the first to emphasize that insufficient density of 
contribution to old-age pensions for the middle classes (second and third pillars), can be 
driven by the inadequate design of first pillar programs. To be sure, the literature showed 
long ago that the marginal link between contributions and benefits in contributory old-age 
pensions for the middle classes affects the supply of hours to the labor market (Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff, 1987), but was silent on choice between covered and uncovered jobs. 
Another literature argues that the design of mandatory old-age pensions for the middle 
classes ("second pillars") affects choice between covered and uncovered jobs, but is silent 
on the effect of first-pillar design. Valdés-Prieto (2002, p. 241-57) showed how the 
presence of uncovered jobs allows workers to cap the implicit tax imposed by a second 
pillar, but is silent on the impact on density. Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) argue that 
a high rate of withdrawal of subsidies to the old poor reduces the voluntary saving of the    3 
poor, but are silent on the impact on density of contribution to second pillars.
3 The 
literature on optimal income tax schedules stresses the disincentive effect on supply of 
hours of violent withdrawal of subsidies, identifies the optimal two-bracket schedule 
(Slemrod et al, 1994), and more general optimal tax schedules (Diamond, 1998), but is 
silent on job choice. The idea that when a participant already meets the vesting requirement 
for the Minimum Pension Subsidy, she finds that additional contributions do not increase 
her total contributory pension is very old, but is not explicit about job choice and density. 
 
This paper contributes the first formal model for the link between first-pillar design and 
density of contribution to second-pillar (mandatory) pensions. It shows that at given wages, 
changes in the design of first-pillar subsidies can have a large impact on the choice between 
jobs covered by the mandate to contribute and uncovered jobs, implying a large elsticity of 
labor supply to the covered sector to the relative wage paid by that sector. If the demand for 
labor in the covered sector has some elasticity, these changes in job choice reduce 
contribution density in equilibrium. This implies that badly designed noncontributory 
subsidies may crowd out contributory pensions and crowd in self-employment, informal 
jobs and home production among those that find the first-pillar subsidies significant.
4  
 
The policy implication is a new approach to raise density of contribution: to improve the 
design of the first pillar. Results in optimal income tax theory by Slemrod et al (1994) and 
Diamond (1998) recommend a withdrawal rate at low income levels, larger than the rate for 
median income levels (Valdés-Prieto 2002, p. 67-71). The simulations by Poblete (2005) 
for a simplified model found that the optimal level for withdrawal rates is modest – about 
20% - . This is much lower than in the second tranche of the “minimum pension 
supplement” of the new Swedish system, where the withdrawal rate is 48% (Scherman, 
1999). An optimal withdrawal rate above zero also implies that universal flat pensions are 
not recommended.  The design called “proportional minimum pension”, used by 
Switzerland, is shown to create large horizontal inequities and to have lower efficiency than 
a program with a small withdrawal rate. 
 
The Chilean reform of 2008 adopted this approach, as it replaced existing non-contributory 
subsidies whose withdrawal rates range from 100% to 61%, for a unified new subsidy with 
a withdrawal rate of about 32% in response to mandatory contributory pensions. However, 
a controversial cliff withdrawal for other income was retained and the size of first pillar 
subsidies was increased too lavishly because of fiscal abundance (Valdes-Prieto 2008, 
companion paper). 
 
Section 2 presents a benchmark model for the theory of non-contributory subsidies 
developed in the next sections. Section 3 uses the model to show how two standard non-
contributory subsidy schemes induce a reduction in contribution density and crowd out 
contributory systems. Section 4 uses the same model to analyze a new generation of 
designs for first-pillar pensions: a proportional minimum pension, and a subsidy with a 
                                                 
3 Although the empirical literature on the impact of tax incentives on voluntary saving finds modest 
elasticities for the poor (Attanasio and Browning, 1996), violent withdrawal of subsidies create unusually 
large implicit tax rates, so the effect on voluntary saving can still be sizable. 
4 A similar argument may apply to undereporting of earnings.    4 
small withdrawal rate. Section 5 evaluates the impact of low density of contributions on the 
social value of a mandate to save for old age. The final remarks point out that the social 
value of a contributory system may depend on the quality of non-contributory subsidies. 
 
 
2.  A theory of first-pillar pensions: the benchmark 
 
This section presents a model where each individual chooses between jobs covered and 
uncovered by a mandate to contribute to an old-age pension plan. Therefore, coverage of 
contributions in the contributory plan is endogenous. In the benchmark case, 
noncontributory subsidies are not available in old age. 
 
2.1 Assumptions about the labor market 
 
The State is unable to enforce a mandate to contribute based on all labor productivity. This 
is obvious for home production. Self-employment also facilitates underreporting of work 
and earnings, for two reasons: (i) there is no employer interested in maximizing reported 
labor costs in order to minimize corporate income taxes; and (ii) there is no employer 
interested in minimizing the penalties applied by enforcers of employment protection 
regulations, which include compliance with social security. Thirdly, informal activities, 
defined as those that evade taxes and regulations, also evade the mandate to contribute. The 
informal employer loses by reporting the earnings of his employee to the State, because this 
betrays its presence. Thus, there are several reasons why a mandate to participate in 
contributory old-age pensions is never fully enforced by the State. Moreover, the State may 
be unwilling to enforce a mandate to contribute on the self-employed that are poor. This 
can originate legal exemptions to the mandate to contribute. 
 
The premise of this paper is that uncovered jobs are a significant job option, and not a 
marginal or irrelevant exception. The proportion of the active labor force not covered by 
contributory systems is above 25% in South Korea and Chile. Empirical work for Chile 
finds that uncovered jobs are a realistic option for many workers (Torche and Wagner, 
1998). In most emerging economies uncovered jobs are closer to 50%, and in most 
countries in Africa and South Asia it is closer to 80%. (van Ginneken, 1999). 
 
“Contribution density” is defined as the share of (the present value of) earnings in the 
active phase of life on which the individual contributes to some second pillar old-age 
system. Average density falls when self-employment expands and when activity outside the 
labor force (mainly home production) rises, for any given rate of turnover between covered 
jobs and other uses of time. Density also falls when underreporting of earnings rises. 
 
This is a model under certainty. It collapses a continuum of dates and ages into just two 
separate periods, called active and passive phases of life. The “passive” label is inexact 
because work in old age is allowed. The labor market and tax variables are: 
 
y
c = gross earnings in the covered sector per unit time, in the active phase. 




c = earnings per unit time in self-employment and jobs that are exempt of or 
evade the mandate to contribute, in the active phase. z
ex is the ratio y
ex/y
c. 
D = density, ε [0,1]. It is the proportion of (the present value of) earnings in the active 
phase of life on which the individual contributes to some second pillar old-age system. 
ep = earnings in old age, expressed as a proportion of y
c.  Exempt from taxes. 
tp = other net taxes that are applied only to contributory pensions in old age. 
 
Labor supply in active life is assumed to have a zero income elasticity. Although this is 
restrictive, it makes it transparent that the results of this paper do not rely on the income 
effect on leisure triggered by the introduction of non-contributory subsidies for old age. 
 
The tax rates ta and tp are significant, because contributory pensions and covered earnings 
are subject to substantial health insurance taxes, while exempt jobs and the product of 
voluntary saving are free from those taxes. Health insurance taxes are large and highly 
redistributive, in the sense that they have almost no compensatory benefits at the margin. 
Covered earnings are also subject to the taxes that finance other branches of social 
insurance, and to mandatory housing contributions (as in Brazil and Mexico), whose 
marginal benefits are way below the marginal tax rate. 
 
2.2 The contributory old-age pension system for the middle classes 
 
Consider a contributory system in the absence of non-contributory pensions. The main 
benevolent justification for State promotion of contributory old-age pensions (mandates, 
fiscal incentives) is to help those that neglect old age. Many workers have difficulty 
visualizing the long-term future. Others suffer from excessive optimism and neglect old age 
and its pessimistic overtones until late in their lives. This justification is not modeled 
explicitly here (for an explicit model, see Valdes-Prieto 2002, section 3.3). 
 
Workers may choose jobs without giving due credit to some benefits linked to work in 
covered jobs, not available in uncovered jobs. These include access to on-the-job learning, 
to employer-financed training, to social advancement and access to networks, and access to 
the future growth of the modern economy driven in part by general knowledge externalities. 
Covered jobs also increase consumer-credit limits, since covered earnings can be verified 
by the lender. So even if there is no undervaluation of old-age pensions available in covered 
jobs, undervaluation of these other benefits would justify some intervention. 
 
Any contributory system for the middle classes can be described by parameters related to 
contributions, pension ages, the initial benefit (pension) and the indexation rule for ongoing 
pensions. Since only two phases of life are considered, several of these parameters do not 
apply here. Because the function of progressive redistribution is performed by the first-
pillar subsidy, the second pillar is assumed to be purely earnings-related i.e. that avoids 
intra-generational redistribution.
5 This cuts down the number of parameters to just four: 
                                                 
5 This division of roles maximizes transparency and thus minimizes the risk of capture by pressure groups. 
This division does not impair the ability of the first pillar and of the tax system to redistribute on the basis of 
lifetime wealth, since subsidies and taxes in old-age are conditional on income flows that depend on lifetime 
earnings, such as contributory pensions and capital income.    6 
 
θ = contribution rate for old age, applicable only in covered jobs and uniform for all 
participants. This rate is applied to each individual’s contribution base. 
CB = contribution base for old age, defined as CB(y
c) = Min[MTE; Max(0; y
c - LTE)], 
where LTE is Least taxable earnings and MTE is Maximum taxable earnings. 
R
c = internal rate of return (real terms) paid by the contributory system to each generation 
of participants. The financing method used by the contributory pension system affects 
the average R
c per generation: full funding should make R
c equal to the returns on 
saving offered by voluntary saving vehicles, while mature pay-as-you-go finance under 
a rule where at least one parameter is adjusted to insure financial independence from the 
fiscal budget, makes R
c equal to the growth rate of the real covered wage bill. 
D2P = minimum density required to vest second-pillar old-age benefits. The individual that 
does not comply with density D2P loses all contributions (those made in the name of the 
employer and on the name of the worker). Equivalently, R
c = -100% if D < D2P . 
Vesting conditions are standard in traditional contributory systems. In the U.S. Social 
Security system, D2P = 120 months (10 years). In contrast, notional and fully funded 
defined contribution systems usually set D2P = 0. 
 
To simplify the model, it is assumed that LTE is zero, that MTE is large enough to be 
irrelevant for interactions with noncontributory subsidies, and that D2P is zero. For the 





In the case where the State gives fiscal incentives to old-age saving (individual or 
employer-based, or “third-pillar saving”), the tax regimes affects ta, R
c and tp. Each of this 
rates should be interpreted as net of the advantage granted by the tax regime. 
 
In the case of mandatory systems (second-pillar), tax rates ta and tp represent implicit taxes. 
In the accumulation phase, the stock of accumulated mandatory contributions for old age is 
not available to cover legitimate emergencies, owing to the inalienability of pension rights 
in a mandatory system (a creditor is not allowed to collect a lien on pension rights; 
Andolfatto, 2002). In contrast, in exempt jobs all saving can be held in liquid form, if 
needed, so saving is more valuable. The difference in value is an implicit tax on mandatory 
saving, which can be included in ta (Valdés-Prieto 2002, p. 223-229). Similarly, the 
illiquidity created by mandatory annuitization can be represented with a higher tp. 
 
2.3 Income identities and budget constraints 
 
In each phase of life, the income identities before any voluntary saving are: 
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It is instructive to obtain from (1) the marginal rate of transformation between ya and yp: 
 
                                                 






c)]  if D > D2P  and 0 if not.     7 
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Equation (1c) shows that the effective gross rate of return on contributions can be much 
higher than (1+R
c), because the denominator  θ θ / )] 1 ( [ a
ex t z − − −  can be small, or even 
negative. This is the critical feature of the model presented in this paper.  
 
In the case of workers that (partially) neglect old age due to excessive optimism, an old-age 
pension is valued at less than if old age is fully visualized, but is not valued at zero. 
Although job choice focuses to a larger degree on maximizing current job conditions when 
those preferences rule, pensions still have some weight. If the effective gross rate of return 
on contributions is high enough (if  θ θ / )] 1 ( [ a
ex t z − − −  is small enough) for a given 
participant that neglects old age to some degree, she may choose an interior solution.  
 
The argument that the poor never save for old age because their current needs outweigh any 
gain from saving for the long term (Titelman and Uthoff 2005, Van Ginneken 2007) is not 
generally valid, because the effective rate of return on contributions can be large enough to 
make old-age benefits valued in active life. In the same way, the argument that iliquidity 
must lead to null valuation of contributory pensions (Diamond and Valdes-Prieto 1994) is 
also invalid, because the effective rate of return can be large enough to compensate. 
 
Remark: a tradeoff between job choice and saving arises only if the denominator in (1c) is 
positive, i.e. if  ) 1 ( a
ex t z − − > θ . If not, covered jobs are productive enough, relative to 
uncovered jobs, to yield more income in both phases of life. The extra productivity of 
covered jobs (over exempt jobs) makes up for contributions θ and the tax differential ta, so 
that the contributory pension comes for free. This leads to choose the maximum possible 
density, D* = 1, regardless of the individual’s subjective discount rate. 
 
Now add the possibility of pure voluntary saving in amount S, which may be negative. The 
rate of return in pure saving is r (in real terms, after tax if any), and may depend on the sign 
of S. Empirically, the rate of return is larger when the individual is indebted with consumer 
loans, than when he is a net saver (r(-) > r(+)). The period budget constraints are: 
 
(2a)  S D y c a a − = ) ( 
(2b) ))] ( ( 1 [ ) ( S sign r S D y c p p + ⋅ + =  
 
2.4 Individual optimization 
 
The individual maximizes lifetime utility. As usual, utility is assumed to be additive 
separable across phases of life. As explained before, labor supply is assumed to be 
independent from income in the active phase to avoid interaction with the allocative effects 
of the introduction of non-contributory subsidies, which create income effects. To achieve 
this, the utility function must be quasi-linear in consumption (Diamond, 1998). To simplify    8 
further, the utility of leisure in old age is assumed to be additive separable from the utility 
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ε ε p
p p a a l S D
l to and D to to subject
l n c v l u c U Max
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where la and  ) / ( 1 p
c
p p w y e l − ≡  is the proportion of hours taken as leisure in the 
corresponding phase of life, and wp is the net wage per hour available for work in old age. 
As usual, u’, v’ and n’ are positive, while second derivatives are negative. The utility 
discount factor for old age is incorporated into the functions v and n. 
 
Since in this model the budget constraint is the result of competition between linear 
options, many corner solutions are possible. Rather than going through all possible 
combinations in the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, these corners are ordered using the following 
identity, obtained from (P1), which can be written in two ways: 
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Equations (3) show that the relationship between pure saving and job choice (selection of 
density) depends on the sign of two terms: the term ( ) ) 1 ( a
ex t z − − − θ , which is the relative 
productivity of the uncovered sector, and the term in the square bracket of (3b).  
 
If expression ( ) ) 1 ( a
ex t z − − − θ  is negative, meaning that covered jobs are productive 
enough to dominate uncovered jobs, version (3a) must be used, where it can be seen that 
both terms in the square brackets are positive If inaddition pure saving S is an interior 
solution ( S U ∂ ∂  is zero), the positive square bracket makes  D U ∂ ∂  positive, even in the 
polar case where R
c = -1. Thus, D* is in the corner with D* = 1. This is intuitive, because a 
negative ( ) ) 1 ( a
ex t z − − − θ  makes choosing covered jobs dominant. 
 
When expression ( ) ) 1 ( a
ex t z − − − θ  is positive, version (3b) can be used and is more 
revealing. If voluntary saving S is in an interior solution (if  S U ∂ ∂  is zero), the sign of 
D U ∂ ∂  is governed by the sign of the term in square brackets of (3b). This term is the 
difference between the net return of saving through the contributory system (eq. 1c) and the 
return on saving through voluntary vehicles. Either return may dominate. If the term in 
square brackets is negative, saving through the mandatory system is inferior to voluntary 
saving and the labor optimum is at the corner with the lowest possible density (D*= 0, case 
F1 below). If the term in the square bracket is positive, the labor optimum is with D* = 1    9 
(case F3 below). An interior solution for D applies to a range of intermediate cases 
(D* ] 1 , 0 [ ε , case F2 below). 
 
PROPOSITION 1:  
The worker’s optimum can be in one of only four situations, labeled F1 to F4: 
a) F1: covered jobs do not dominate uncovered jobs, and pure saving for old age has a 
higher net effective return than saving in the contributory system. Therefore, the 
individual prefers zero density (D* = 0) and channels any desired saving through pure 
saving vehicles.   
b) F2: covered jobs do not dominate uncovered jobs. The rate of return on saving in the 
contributory system is intermediate between the return on pure saving r(+) and interest 
on consumer credit r(-). If D* is interior then S* = 0. If D* = 1 then S* > 0. 
c) F3: covered jobs do not dominate uncovered jobs. The return on contributory-system 
saving is higher than the interest in consumer credit r(-). D* = 1. 
d) F4: covered jobs dominate uncovered jobs. Thus D* = 1 and S* can have any sign. 
 
Proof: A combination of eq. (3) and the global analysis provided in figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1 shows the consumption opportunity sets. The heavy line from A to F represents 
incomes achievable in the absence of voluntary saving (S = 0). Extreme A corresponds to 
the case in which the worker chooses zero density (absence of contributions to the second 
pillar), while extreme F corresponds to full contribution density, i.e. to D = 100 percent. 
The equation for AF is obtained by eliminating D from equations (1a) and (1b). The slope 
of AF is the net return of mandatory saving,  ( ) θ θ / )] 1 ( [ / ) 1 )( 1 ( a
ex
p
c t z t R − − − − + , which 
is the MRTCS that appears in equations (1c) and (3b). Recall that this return can be much 
higher than (1+R
c)(1-tp), because the denominator  θ θ / )] 1 ( [ a
ex t z − − −  can be small. The 
height of AF in the vertical dimension is 
c
p
c y t R ⋅ − + ⋅ ) 1 )( 1 ( θ , so it is zero if R
c = -1. 
 
In figure 1, opportunities for extra saving are represented by the dashed line that starts at F4 
and goes Northwest. The individual may also choose to save less than θ by issuing 
consumer debt, an option represented by the dotted line that starts from F4 and goes 
Southeast. The higher slope of the line going Southeast represents a higher interest rate on 
consumer debt.    10 
 
Figure 1: Budget constraints created by a second pillar in the absence of noncontributory 
pensions (left panel: vase F1; right panel: cases F2 and F3) 
 
The left panel shows the case F1, where covered jobs do not dominate uncovered jobs, and 
in addition, the slope of line AF1 is smaller than (1+r(+)) in absolute value (and also 
smaller than 1+r(-), since r(-) > r(+)). This means that voluntary saving for old age is more 
attractive than the contributory saving associated to covered jobs. The implication for 
contribution density is dramatic: the individual is better off by moving to the corner with 
zero density (D* = 0) and making any desired saving through voluntary vehicles. This is of 
direct policy interest: if the contributory systems offer a relatively low net rate of return, all 
workers prefer zero density.  
 
The case labeled as F2 (right panel) shows that when the return offered by the second pillar 
(the slope of line AF2) is intermediate between the return offered by voluntary saving 
vehicles (1+r(+)) and the cost of consumer credit (1+r(-)), the individual may choose an 
interior density of contribution (0 < D* < 1), rather than the corner with D* = 1. This 
happens when the contribution rate θ is larger than the desired saving rate: in this situation, 
excess saving must be undone is full density is selected, and a limited reduction in density 
is cheaper than incurring expensive consumer debt. However, if the desired saving rate is 
higher than θ, then D* = 1 and S* > 0, as in point J. 
 
In case F3, also in the right panel of figure 1, and interior contribution density is never 
optimal. When the contribution rate θ is larger than the desired saving rate, a limited 
reduction in density is more expensive than consumer debt. Thus D* = 1. 
 
The case labeled F4 is not shown for simplicity. Its graph is similar to case F3, with one 












Cp    11 
 
The model also yields interesting comparative statics results. For example, if the rate of 
return paid by the contributory system rises, this reduction will have no effect initially on 
decisions by workers, because they still prefer the same set of densities of contribution. 
However, when this rate of return (given by the slope of AF) rises above a threshold given 
by the return on voluntary saving r(+), then all the workers in case F1 switch to case F2 
and raise density discontinuously from D* = 0 to D* ε (0,1]. Further increases in the rate of 
return paid by the contributory system attract continuous adjustments to the density of 
contribution if there was an interior solution, but density may rise or fall, falling if income 
effects compensate substitution effects. When additional increases in the rate of return paid 
by the contributory system equalizes the slope of AF to the interest on consumer credit r(-), 
all workers in case F2 jump to case F3. Density jumps discontinuously to D* = 1. Thus, 
contribution density can be quite elastic to the net rate of return paid by mandatory saving. 
 
If the demand of uncovered jobs is elastic, so that wages do not change much in response to 




3.  Standard first-pillar pensions in the presence of a contributory system  
 
First-pillar pensions are noncontributory subsidies for the old poor. The standard rationale 
for them is progressive redistribution. This rationale encompasses the rationale of avoiding 
horizontal inequity and risk aversion from behind a veil of ignorance. 
 
This section demonstrates the proposition that non-contributory subsidies for the old (first 
pillars) crowd out contributory pensions (second and third pillars). This proposition is valid 
only for those workers that have low labor productivity. This is because the amounts of first 
pillar pensions must be attractive for their presence to make a difference. This is certainly 
the case for the lifetime poor, but it may also be the case for the lower middle classes. 
 
Two prevalent designs for first-pillar pensions are assistance pensions and minimum 
pension subsidies. They are analyzed separately. 
 
3.1 Introduction of an Assistance Pension in the presence of a contributory system  
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where T is a threshold for the size of the contributory pension measured in $/month. An 
assistance pension may also have analogous thresholds, referred to the size of labor 
earnings in old age, to the size of per capita household income (which is indicative of 
                                                 
7 The effects on individual saving do not have an impact on the aggregate capital stock, because the affected 
workers receive a modest fraction of national income.    12 
intrahousehold transfers) and to the size of capital consumption. If all thresholds are raised 
without bounds, a universal flat pension obtains.  
 
The point is that a higher density of contribution D raises the contributory pension, and this 
may trigger the full loss of the subsidy, of size A. The budget constraint for old age must be 
modified to: 
 
(2b’)  ) , ( ))] ( ( 1 [ ) ( T D NCS S sign r S D y c
A
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The results of going through the new budget equations are presented in detail for case F2, 
and to save space the results are merely summarized for cases F1, F3 and F4.  
 
The introduction of the Assistance Pension changes the budget constraint from (2b) to (2b’) 
and this twists the thick solid line AF2 in figure 2, by adding the thick dotted line 
AA’DEF2. This line falls in point D, to register the fact that when density rises sufficiently 
to make the contributory pension exceed the statutory threshold T, the worker loses the 
whole subsidy A at once. Thus, at E his old age income is limited to income from work and 
the contributory pension. 
 
The thick budget lines do not consider pure saving S. Pure saving and dissaving 
opportunities at point F2 create, respectively, the dashed line that goes from F2 to the 
Northwest (net saver status), and the narrow dotted line that goes from F2 to the Southeast 
(net debtor status). Similarly, saving opportunities around point D create the dashed line 
that starts from D to the Northwest, and opportunities for consumer credit create the narrow 
dotted line that starts from D to the Southeast. Although point F2 is not dominated, it now 
has serious competitors along line A’D. 
 
 
Figure 2: Contribution density falls when an Assistance Pension is introduced  
(case F2 with S*= 0 in the absence of noncontributory pensions) 
Threshold for Contri-
butory pension (T) 
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If the original optimal decision for density was at point B, the introduction of the assistance 
pension can change the preferred density to a point like C. The new density of contribution 
is definitely below the original one. This is shown by the thick horizontal arrow, which 
measures the increase in consumption in the active phase due to the choice of longer spells 
in uncovered jobs, brought about by the introduction of the assistance pension. The optimal 
contribution density falls discontinuously due to the introduction of the assistance pension. 
 
The abrupt withdrawal of the assistance pension at point E explains the large incentive to 
reduce contribution density, that is, to reject covered jobs and give preference to self-
employment and home production once D has been reached. If the demand of covered jobs 
is elastic, so that wages do not change much in response to these changes in job choice, 
equilibrium contribution density will change. The conclusion is that the design of the 
assistance pension drives a reduction in equilibrium contribution density. 
 
In case F1 uncovered jobs are more desirable and all saving for old age is made through 
pure saving vehicles. Since the assistance pension is offered to individuals with zero 
density, its presence is a further reason to keep density at zero. The introduction of the 
assistance pension does not affect the optimal density, which remains at zero in case F1. 
(D*=0). 
 
In cases F3 and F4, the introduction of an assistance pension can affect the choice of 
density (D*=1). This happens if the size A of the subsidy is large enough to be similar in 
size to the contributory pension. In this subcase, there is a tradeoff between reducing 
density below 100% in order to gain access to the subsidy A, and losing income from a 
covered job. The introduction of an assistance pension can reduce density discontinuously . 
 
 
3.2 Introducing a Minimum Pension Subsidy in the presence of a contributory system 
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where DT is a threshold of contribution density required to have access to (vest) the 
subsidy. MPGoal is the statutory level of the minimum pension, which may be adjusted 
annually by ad-hoc legislation to follow the evolution of median or average earnings. This 
is the target that must be reached when adding the noncontributory subsidy to the self-




This design has a double rationale. On the one hand, a higher contributory pension is taken 
as an indication of less need, so the noncontributory subsidy is reduced. On the other hand, 
stimulating the attainment of a positive level of contributions (DT) seems to help alleviate 
neglect of old age. This rationale is discussed further in section 5.    14 
 
Because of the subsidy, the budget constraint in old age is modified to: 
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For the “in-between” range of D, when voluntary saving is held constant: 
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Equation (6) shows that consumption in old age does not increase at all when density rises! 
Each $1 of additional contributory pension is used by the state to withdraw its own subsidy 
by $1, leaving nothing extra to the worker. The “withdrawal rate” of the minimum pension 
subsidy is 100%, in this range. The withdrawal rate is an implicit tax on covered earnings.  
 
Of course, with twisted budget constraints a local analysis such as the one in equation (6) is 
insufficient. In case F2, the global situation is described by figure 3. Unlike the case of the 
assistance pension, no subsidy is obtained with zero density, because the contribution 
requirement of DT years is not met. Accordingly, there is no point A’. Only when the 
worker increases contribution density to point B, does he increase his total old age income, 
including the subsidy, to point B’.  
 
Further contributions after point B’ are fully taken away by the 100% withdrawal rate. For 
example, total income in old age at point C is the same as the one in point B’, despite 
higher density. This is against the worker’s interest, because income during his active phase 
is less at C than at B’ (he has a lower take-home wage owing to the fact that his 
contributions are higher). In figure 3, the bold dotted line is flat in the region in which the 
State reduces the subsidy. The flatness indicates that the withdrawal rate is 100 percent.  
 
We have not considered pure saving S. From any given income point where pure saving is 
zero, positive saving opportunities create the dashed line to the Northwest, andconsumer 
credit creates the dotted line to the Southeast. Figure 3 presents a subcase where F2 is not 
yet dominated by B’. 
    15 
 
Figure 3: Contribution density moves to DT when a Minimum Pension is introduced  
(case F2) 
A participant finds optimal to turn down covered jobs once he has reached or expects to 
reach point B’. If he wants extra consumption at any age, it is always more desirable to 
attain it through pure saving and dissaving than through contributory pensions. For 
example, pure saving allows a move from B’ to E, which dominates a move from B’ to 
point C, because the return on pure saving is not taxed at the expropriatory implicit rate of 
100 percent.   
 
For preferences marked D and E in figure 3, the new optimal density of contribution (at 
point E) is D* = DT, well below the one chosen in the absence of the minimum pension 
subsidy (point D). The thick horizontal arrow in the upper half of figure 3 shows a large 
discontinuous reduction in density of contribution, from point D to B. Some of its 
consumption consequences are undone by increasing voluntary saving from B’ to E. 
 
However, for the preferences marked A and G in figure 3, the new optimal density (which 
supports point G) is higher than the one chosen in the absence of the minimum pension 
subsidy (point A). This is due to the density requirement DT > 0: the participant observes 
that by increasing density up to point B, i.e. by choosing D* = DT, he attains the maximum 
subsidy. This strategy requires sacrifice of some take-home wage, but the consumption loss 
when active can be fully mitigated by taking consumer debt in amount BG (measured in the 
horizontal axis), along the dotted line that starts from B’ to the Southeast. In figure 3 
preferences are chosen so that points G and A yield the same consumption when active. 
Underlying this constancy in consumption there is a large discontinuous increase in density 
of contribution, marked by the thick horizontal arrow from A to B. Thus, a minimum 
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An unintended consequence of a minimum pension subsidy is that it may favor the 




G) in interest for consumer debt. If the supplys of consumer credit is 
less than perfectly elastic, then some of the incidence of the subsidy reaches the owners of 
consumer credit operations. This reduces the efficiency of first pillar subsidies.
8 
 
For completeness, consider cases F1 and F3. In case F1 exempt jobs are preferred and all 
saving for old age is made through pure saving vehicles. In case F1, the minimum pension 
subsidy raises the density of contributions from D* = 0 to D* = DT, in those subcases 
where the size of the maximum subsidy is attractive enough. The figure that proves this is 
omitted for brevity, but the intuition is straightforward: getting to a point like B’, where the 
full subsidy is obtained, can be worth losing the advantages of reducing density to zero.  
 
In case F3, the introduction of a minimum pension subsidy can reduce density from D*=1, 
but only in a rather extreme subcase. Cutting density to D* = DT gives access to the 
maximum subsidy, and this may be larger than the earnings loss due to the lower labor 
productivity of uncovered jobs. This subcase is extreme because D = DT can only be better 
than D = 1 if, at the margin, the present value of the subsidy discounted at rate r(-) rises 
more than what is lost from a more productive job. 
 
 
3.3 Simultaneous presence of an assistance pension and a minimum pension subsidy 
 
A number of countries offer both subsidies together. One reason is that  with a minimum 
pension subsidy alone, women engaged in home production fail and individuals that neglect 
old age choose a density D smaller than DT and can fall into dire poverty when old in the 
absence of intrafamily transfers. 
 
When both subsidies are offered simultaneously, an incompatibility rule is standard: both 
subsidies cannot be received simultaneously (in old age). Provided that the contributory 
system pays an annuity that is constant over time, incompatibility is resolved at pension 
age, as follows: given that density D and pure saving S are pre-determined as of pension 
age, each individual calculates the sum of contributory pensions and each of the subsidies, 
and chooses the highest sum. Since the options will be the same at any time after pension 
age, choices will remain constant over time too. 
 
Figure 4 shows the empirically relevant case where the size A of the assistance pension is 
well below the size of the maximum subsidy offered by the minimum pension. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Since take-up of first pillar subsidies is voluntary, this loss cannot exceed the maximum subsidy. This is not 
the case for mandatory second pillars, where the loss in interest payments in consumer credit can leave the 
participant worse off than in the absence of the second pillar (Valdes-Prieto 2002, p. 215-218).    17 
 
Figure 4: Contribution density falls when both designs are offered simultaneously 
(case F2 in the left panel and case F1 in the right panel) 
 
The left panel of figure 4 shows the simultaneous offer of both subsidies under the 
incompatibility rule, for case F2. The presence of the assistance pension makes selection of 
D* < DT attractive for the individuals with preferences such that, in its absence, would have 
chosen D* = DT (as in point G in figure 3). Thus, the vesting condition of the minimum 
pension subsidy is crowded out by an assistance pension with no vesting condition. 
 
Of course, some individuals would still be attracted to D* = DT, for example those with the 
indifference curve shown in the left panel of figure 4. However, the figure also shows that 
in the absence of both subsidies, that individual would have chosen a density higher than 
DT. Therefore, density always falls (in case F2) when both first-pillar programs are offered. 
 
The right panel of figure 4 shows case F1, where in the absence of subsidies uncovered jobs 
are preferred and all saving for old age is made through pure saving vehicles. The case 
shown is one where pure saving that starts from point A’ dominates pure saving that starts 
from point B’. In this case, the optimal density D* remains at zero despite the presence of a 
minimum pension subsidy that if acting alone would have attracted an increase in D* to DT. 




                                                 
9 This may explain why coverage of contributions fell in Chile  in the late 1970’s as compared to the 1960’s: 
an assistance pension was introduced in 1975. 
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In conclusion, the simultaneous offer of both subsidies eliminates most of the cases where 
minimum pension subsidies increase the density of contribution. 
 
3.4 Implications of the multiperiod nature of old age 
 
This model does not capture the multiperiod nature of old age. A multiplicity of periods 
opens further opportunities to reduce evade the density condition DT and still get subsidies. 
 
For example, participants that do not meet the threshold DT required to access a minimum 
pension subsidy, can contribute for a few years after reaching pension age, until the 
required number of contributions is reached. Some may even declare a fictitious job, whose 
only purpose is to declare contributions and improve the density record (Beyer and Valdes-
Prieto, 2004). If past employers are empowered to supply density records, it is possible to 
request help to raise artificially the reported density, to reach DT.  The officials in charge of 
the records may also be bribed to reach DT. Registry officials may also take the initiative in 
offering adulteration of records. The ability to increase density of the vesting condition in 
the minimum pension design is severely undermined by these strategies. 
 
A density requirement like DT, which is defined in terms of time and not in terms of the 
amount of money contributed, is also vulnerable to underreporting of earnings. Consider 
the case of a fictitious job. In order to minimize the expense of contributing (θ + ta)
.y
c, this 
fictitious job can be declared to be part-time and with a minimum wage. Public sector 
unions in many countries have lobbied successfully to legalize underreporting, by 
relabeling a part of earnings as “not taxable for social security purposes”. 
 
The multiperiod nature of old age also allows the replacement of cliff withdrawal of 
assistance pensions for a withdrawal at a smaller rate. Consider the notion that the threshold 
T must be compared with the current contributory pension, rather than with the 
contributory pension that would have existed if the participant had taken a constant lifetime 
annuity as of pension age. 
 
Consider the subset of participants whose constant for life contributory pension is smaller 
than some level L. If the lifetime annuity that can be financed with the accumulation 
(contributions plus interest) is larger than L, the participant is excluded from the assistance 
pension for life.
10 In the model, this implies considering the subset of participants who 
choose density smaller than D
L = L/y
cθ(1+R
c). If density D* > D
L the participant is 
excluded from the assistance pension. 
 
Introduce now a rule whereby the participant with contributory pension smaller than L is 
allowed to withdraw a pension of amount L from his own accumulation. Because the 
constant-for-life contributory pension is smaller than L, it is clear that the accumulation 
                                                 
10 In Chile this exclusion is implemented in two steps: (i) Mandate the purchase of a lifetime annuity to all 
participants whose accumulation is between 1.0 and 1.5 times the one needed to purchase a lifetime annuity 
equal to the Minimum Pension Goal; and (ii) choose L to be equal to the Minimum Pension Goal.     19 
will be exhausted if the participant survives to the age of life expectancy as of pension age. 
Call this life expectancy LE.   
 
Because of the requirement that the current contributory pension be below threshold T, the 
subsidy A cannot be claimed before the age of exhaustion. However, when and if 
exhaustion occurs, the contributory pension falls to zero. At exhaustion age the participant 
can file for an assistance pension of amount A. 
 
An individual that expects a contributory pension below L may recognize the following: if 
he chooses a higher density of contribution, and attains a higher contributory pension, then 
he will reach exhaustion date at an older age, and will be able to claim subsidy A for a 
shorter period (before death). He will get fewer subsidies in total. 
 
The threshold T fades away in this multiperiod setting: even if his accumulation is unable to 
finance a lifetime annuity equal to T, it will certainly finance a pension equal to L (> T) for 
a few months. While the accumulation is dispersed, the State saves paying the assistance 
pension that it would have paid under the “pure” design presented in section 3.1. 
 
In a model where old age is collapsed into a single period, the life expectancy as of pension 
age has unit duration (LE = 1). In those units, the exhaustion age when the accumulation is 
dispersed at rate L is D
.[ y
cθ(1+R



































c) per unit of density. Cliff withdrawal is smoothed away by the multiperiod 
nature of old age, if the state adapts the rules of the assistance pension as indicated here.  
 
In the case of Chile, the present value (as of pension age) of accumulated assistance 
pensions during old age is subject to a withdrawal rate estimated at 61 percent (Beyer and 
Valdés-Prieto 2004, p. 25-6). This implicit tax on contributions is much lower than the 
infinite (local) withdrawal rate of a standard assistance pension (section 3.1).
11 
 
A potential drawback in this modified assistance pension is that the flow pension in 
$/month drops from $L to $A at the age in which the accumulation in the second pillar is 
exhausted. Since this drop is announced in advance to the participant, he can predict the fall 
and can save in anticipation. Therefore, this design is compatible with efficient 
consumption smoothing. However, if the participant is unable to save, the drop in benefits 
is not optimal, because consumption is not smoothed (Valdes-Prieto, 2006). The drop also 
creates risk for participants if the date in which this fall occurs depends on the financial 
return earned by a pension fund, which is stochastic. 
                                                 
11 The combined effect on density of this modified assitance pension and the minimum pension subsidy is 
discussed in Beyer and Valdés-prieto (2004).    20 
 
Summing up, section 3 finds that standard first pillar subsidies reduce the equilibrium 
density of contribution. The implication is that part of self-employment among the low-
productivity workers can be explained by the poor design of these social programs. They 
create a “low contribution density trap.” This trap severely punishes, through subsidy 
withdrawal, those who increase their contribution density. At the same time, these 
programs have been successful at improving the material well-being of their beneficiaries. 
 
 
4. Second-generation designs for first-pillar pensions 
 
This section analyzes two second-generation designs: a “proportional” minimum pension, 
and a subsidy with a single withdrawal rate in proportion to second pillar pensions. 
 
4.1 A proportional minimum pension 
 
Consider a “proportional” minimum pension like the one that Switzerland had in its AHV 
system (Valdés-Prieto 2002, p. 62). In this design, the goal used by the minimum pension 
subsidy is not a fixed number, but is proportional to the number of years (or months) of 
contribution attained by each individual participant. This design can be represented by the 
following expression for the subsidy amount: 
 
(8)  ( ) [ ] )) ( ( ; 0
i i
R R
i i N D CP MPGoal N N Max PMPS − ⋅ =
     ($/month) 
 
where PMPS
i is the amount of the monthly subsidy in old age for participant i, N
i is the 
number of periods of contributions by participant i (when the period is made smaller, an 
almost continuous version is obtained), MPGoalR  is the minimum pension goal for a 
reference number of periods of contribution, namely NR, and CP
i is the contributory 
pension built by participant i, which depends on density, which also depends the number of 
periods of contribution. Note that the minimum density requirement DT is zero. 
 
Equation (8) highlights the fact that the proportion of periods in which contributions are 
made is different from density, which is the proportion of the present value of earnings that 
is subject to contribution. The distinction is important because N
i affects the contributory 
pension exponentially: a higher N
i allows the internal rate of return of the second pillar 
system to operate for a longer time. For the admittedly restrictive case of a flat age-earnings 
profile with constant per-period density of contribution, the contributory pension is 





c , where k
i is a 
proportionality constant that depends on the declared earnings of individual i, the per-
period density and life expectancy, and R
c is now the per-period internal rate of return paid 
by the contributory system to each generation.  
    21 
In contrast, the minimum pension goal grows linearly with N
i. The discrepancy between 
exponential and linear growth has three implications: 
12 
 
a)  When the number of years of contribution is small, the minimum pension goal grows 
faster than the contributory pension. Since the subsidy grows with N
i, there exists a 
marginal subsidy to increase the number of periods of contributions. 
b)  For a larger number of years of contribution, the subsidy falls with N
i, and thus there 
is a marginal tax on raising density. The marginal tax is zero when PMPS
i reaches 0. 
c)  The amount of the subsidy has a different interior maximum for each k
i. The N
i that 
maximizes the subsidy is larger for lower declared salaries.
13 
 
Valdés-Prieto (2006) argued against a proportional minimum pension on the grounds of 
inefficiency and horizontal inequity. Inefficiency occurs because the marginal tax/subsidy 
rate on additional contributions varies in an unintended and very wide range. The value 
depends on the size of individual earnings (k
i) and on N
i, even for cases with constant per-
period density of contribution. According to simulations, the marginal subsidy can be as 
high as 350% for low values of k
i and falls continuously as N
i rises until very negative rates 
are reached, according to a curvature that depends on the size of earnings. A 350% subsidy 
rate is large enough to justify fraud. At the other extreme, the very high implicit tax rates on 
additional contributions applied to many participants means that one of the less desirable 
aspects of the minimum pension subsidy is retained. 
 
A withdrawal rate that varies continuously with (k
i, N
i) also has a high level of complexity, 
relative to a subsidy with a unique withdrawal rate, and this raises the risk of planning 
errors for individuals. Finally, the proportional minimum pension remains vulnerable to 
underreporting of earnings.  
 
Moreover, the proportional minimum pension fails the test of horizontal inequity as soon as 
density of contribution ceases to be constant. The following illustration was offered by 
Valdés-Prieto (2006).  
 
Case A: A seasonally employed woman works intensively on the fruit harvest for 3 months a year, 
earning a wage of CLP$ 200,000 a month in exchange for 12-hour workdays sweating in the sun. It is 
assumed that she works seasonally from the ages of 20 to 39. Then at age 60 she meets the legal age for 
starting a contributory pension, which may last until she dies at age 82. She postpones consumption of 
her contributions for 41 years on average. 
 
Case B: Another (middle or upper class) woman works as a part-time secretary for a wage of CLP$ 
132,665 a month, 5 hour a day, 12 months a year, between the ages of 40 and 59. Her contributory 
pension may last from age 60 until she dies at age 82. She postpones consumption of her contributions 
for only 21 years on average. 
 
                                                 
12 This discrepancy cannot be captured by the model of sections 2 and 3, where all periods in the active phase 
collapse into one. This prevents distinction between density D and the number N of periods of contribution. 





















∂  if PMPS
i > 0.    22 
In this illustration the numbers are chosen to insure that the account balance at age 60 
(pension age) is the same for both women, if the real interest rate is 5 percent a year (the 
balance is CLP$5.4 million). Therefore, both self-finance a contributory pension of CLP$ 
31,105 per month (if annuities yield 4 percent real). Since the accumulation as of pension 
age is a measure of the overall saving effort, both should get the same subsidy. 
 
The seasonal fruit-picker has only five years (60 months) of contribution. If the minimum 
pension goal (MPGoalR) is CLP$90,000 for a reference period of NR = 20 years, (close to 
Chilean reality as of 2006), the proportional minimum pension goal for her is 
(5/20)
.CLP$90,000 = CLP$ 22,500. As this is smaller than her contributory pension of 
CLP$31,105/month, her subsidy is zero! 
 
In contrast, the middle class secretary has 20 years of contributions. Her proportional 
minimum pension goal is (20/20)
.CLP$90,000. Given her contributory pension of CLP$ 
31,105/month, her subsidy is CLP$ 58,895 per month. This subsidy lasts about 22 years on 
average, counted from age 60. The present value of this subsidy as of age 60, discounted at 
a real interest rate of 4 percent is CLP$ 10.2 million. Comparing with her accumulation at 
age 60, the average rate of subsidy for her is 190 percent. 
 
Although the seasonal fruit-picker can collect the assistance pension, the amount of the 
assistance pension is about half the CLP$90,000. The inequity is obvious. 
 
The general lesson is that a proportional minimum pension suffers from defining effort in 
terms of the number of years (or months) of contribution, rather than in money terms. 
Because of these inequities, a proportional minimum pension cannot be Pareto efficient, or 
optimal according to any social welfare function. 
 
 
4.2 A subsidy with a small withdrawal rate 
 
This section evaluates a family of noncontributory subsidies where the withdrawal rate is 
set at a much smaller value. Valdés-Prieto (2002, pp. 57 and 70) summarized this design 
with the following formula: 
 
(9)   [] ) ( ; 0 max ) ( D CP BP D NCS
SW ⋅ − = γ   
 
where CP(D) is the contributory pension financed by the participant, BP is a basic pension 
or subsidy given to those that never contributed to the second pillar, and γ is the 
“withdrawal rate” of the subsidy, with γ ε (0,1). This withdrawal rate can also be defined as 
γ = BP/MCPWS, where MCPWS is the “maximum contributory pension with subsidy”.  
 
Equation (9) includes the minimum pension subsidy of section 3.2, as a polar case, by 
making γ = 1 and DT = 0. In the other polar case where γ = 0 (if MCPWS = ∞), this formula 
generates a flat, universal pension (paid to all), as in Denmark and New Zealand. In the 
nonlinear case where γ = 0 when CP(D) < T , γ = ∞ at CP(D) = T, and γ = 0 thereafter for 
CP(D) > T, this formula reproduces the standard assistance pension of section 3.1.    23 
 
Therefore, the “small withdrawal rate” family described by equation (9) is between the two 
extremes of a standard minimum pension subsidy and a universal flat pension.
14 An 
imperfect example is the second tranche of the new Swedish “minimum pension 
supplement”, which was legislated in the 1990s and implemented in 2003. This subsidy is 
nonlinear and has two tranches, identified by γ = 1 when CP(D) < 1.26 base amounts, and 
by γ = 0.48 when CP(D) is between 1.26 and 3.07 base amounts (Scherman, 1999). The 
basic subsidy is 2.13 base amounts, or 77,532 SKR per year in 1998. According to Palme 
(2003), the Swedish design is based on older Finnish and Norwegian designs. Another 
example of “small withdrawal” is the new “solidarity pension” created by the 2008 pension 
reform in Chile (Valdés-Prieto 2008, companion paper), where the withdrawal rate is γ = 
0.32 and there is a single tranche. 
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with γ < 1. The budget constraint for old age is modified to: 
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For the applicable range of D, when voluntary saving is held constant: 
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Equation (11) says that consumption in the old age increases in proportion to (1-γ) when 
density rises. Each $1 of additional contributory pension is used by the state to withdraw its 
subsidy by $γ cents, leaving $(1-γ) cents to the participant, to increase his total pre-tax 
pension (which combines subsidies and contributory pensions). In present discounted value 




As before, local analysis is insufficient. The optimization program P1 is modified by 
introducing (2b’’’) to incorporate the first-pillar pension. The modified program P1’ applies 
to the combined system, and not just to the contributory part. The budget constraint remains 
the result of competition between linear options. Again, the many corner solutions can be 
ordered using the following identity obtained from (P1’): 
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14 See PowerPoint presentation to the PACPR (Valdes-Prieto, 2006).    24 
 
Equation (12) differs from (3b) only because the net rate of return offered by the combined 
contributory-noncontributory system is multiplied by (1-γ), before comparing with the 
return of pure saving. This affects the frontier between cases F1 and F2, and it increases the 
range of parameters in which case F1 applies, where D* = 0. The presence of (1-γ) also 
affects the frontier between case F2 and F3, by reducing the range of parameters where case 
F3 applies, where D* = 1. The range of cases where F4 applies is still given by the sign of 
( ) ) 1 ( a
ex t z − − − θ , which is not modified by γ. 
 
 
Figure 5: First-pillar subsidy with small withdrawal rate (case F2) 
 
Figure 5 provides a global analysis when case F2 applies before and after the introduction 
of a first pillar with a small withdrawal rate γ. The basic subsidy BP is paid to persons who 
make no contribution to the second pillars, as indicated by points A and A’. The subsidies 
are the vertical distance between the solid line, AF2, and the dotted line A’C. The 
maximum contributory pension that receives a subsidy, the MCPWS, is the contributory 
pension at point C. The slope of A’C is the net return of the combined two-pillar system, 
which is the slope of AC, MRTCS, times the new factor (1-γ). The slope of CF2 is not 
affected by (1-γ). 
 
As before, pure saving and dissaving opportunities are indicated in Figure 5 with dashed 
and dotted lines. The assumption that case F2 applies both before and after the introduction 
of this first pillar is reflected in the slope of the dashed and dotted lines: the dashed lines are 
flatter than both AC and A’C, while the dotted lines are steeper than both AC and A’C. In 
this case, figure 5 shows that the introduction of this noncontributory subsidy reduces 
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Figure 5 shows that when case F2 is preserved, the reduction in density is smaller than in 
the standard first pillar designs reviewed in section 3, if γ is smaller than 100%, in the case 
of the standard minimum pension. Although section 3 did not show in detail the cases when 
the introduction of a first pillar changes the case from F2 to F1, and from F3 to F2, a 
detailed analysis also shows that these case changes apply to a smaller range when the 
withdrawal rate is smaller, and thus that these drops in density are less likely. 
 
Other configurations are possible: First, if the slope of the dashed line (return 1+r(+)) is 
steeper than A’C (but not of AC), then the introduction of this first pillar subsidy changes 
the situation from case F2 to case F1, and density drops discontinuously from D* ε (0,1).  
to D* = 0. If the slope of the dotted line (return 1+r(-)) is flatter than AC (but not of A’C), 
then the introduction of this first pillar subsidy changes the situation from case F3 to case 
F3, and density also drops discontinuously from D* = 1 to D* ε (0,1). 
15Despite the 
approximate preservation of a range where case F2 applies, the introduction of this first 
pillar subsidy always creates a discontinuous drop in density when a case change occurs. 
 
Summarizing, the gain offered by a small withdrawal rate is that density of contribution to 
the second pillar is reduced by less than with the standard designs. As the withdrawal rate is 
reduced towards zero, the crowding out of the contributory system is alleviated by more. 
 
The optimal withdrawal rate 
 
Why not reduce the withdrawal rate to zero, and adopt a universal pension? This appears to 
eliminate all crowding out of the second pillar. The fiscal cost of a universal pension is 
larger than in a scheme with a positive withdrawal rate, and this requires higher tax rates 
and additional distortions.  
 
Alternatively, why not reduce the withdrawal rate to zero for the poor, by starting 
withdrawal only after some threshold in second pillar pensions has been reached? It may be 
argued that the distortions caused by the withdrawal rate would affect only the middle 
classes, where they matter less, not the low productivity workers. This is indeed the design 
of the Social Security system in the United States and the age pension in Australia. 
 
The optimal income tax literature introduced by Mirrlees (19719 offers some answers. The 
simulation results of Slemrod et al (1994) for an economy with given factor prices
16, and 
whose second pillar is a perfect substitute for voluntary saving,
 show that the optimal two-
bracket income tax has two features: (i) all the marginal tax rates are smaller than 100%; 
(ii) the marginal tax rate for the low-productivity workers should be larger than the one for 
the high-productivity workers. The analytical work by Diamond (1998) for more general 
                                                 
15 In case F4 covered jobs are more productive than exempt ones and D* = 1 in the absence of a first pillar. 
The introduction of a subsidy with a small withdrawal rate can reduce density only in an extreme subcase. 
Cutting density to D* = 0 gives access to the maximum subsidy, and if this subsidy is larger than the earnings 
loss due to the lower labor productivity of exempt jobs. This subcase is extreme because D = 0 can only be 
better than D = 1 if, at the margin, the present value of the subsidy, which is affected by (1-γ) and discounted 
at rate r(-), rises more than what is lost from a more productive job. 
16 This is an appropriate assumption for an open economy, where substitution with foreign saving prevents the 
impact on domestic saving from affecting capital accumulation and labor productivity.     26 
income tax schedules also finds that for the empirical distribution of earnings in the U.S., it 
is optimal to have larger marginal tax rates for low productivity workers than for workers 
near the median of the earnings distribution. 
 
Thus, public finance theory recommends that the “low density trap” be mitigated by 
reducing γ well bellow 100%, but not to zero (Valdés-Prieto 2002, p. 67-71). There is less 
consensus about the level of the contributory pension at which withdrawal should begin. It 
is unknown whether this level should be zero, or should be positive as in the earned income 
tax credit (Diamond, 1998). 
 
Poblete’s 2005 thesis (Universidad Católica de Chile) offers two additional findings, also 
based on simulations in an economy with given factor prices, where only a noncontributory 
subsidy is present. A major difference with Slemrod et al (1994) is that exempt jobs (whose 
saving is not observed by the government in old age) are available to individuals. First, the 
extreme with γ = 0 never maximizes social welfare, because the fiscal cost of the program 
is large and exacerbates tax distortions. Therefore, a universal flat benefit is suboptimal, 
even if feasible. Second, small reductions in γ from an initial level of 100% are irrelevant, 
because participants remain in corner solutions. This is important for first-pillar policy, 
since it suggests that the welfare difference between choosing γ = 0.48 (Swedish second 
tranche) and γ = 0.32 (2008 Chilean reform) may be substantial. Poblete (2005) finds that 
the optimal social value for the withdrawal rate γ is approximately 20 percent, for a 
substantial range of parameters. 
 
A different way to evaluate a small withdrawal rate scheme is to compare it with a 
minimum pension subsidy that has the same fiscal cost. To simplify, let us assume also that 
DT = 0 in the minimum pension subsidy. The equal fiscal cost condition implies that the 
Basic Pension is smaller than the Minimum Pension Goal, and that the small withdrawal 
rate scheme is paid to workers that have a contributory pension larger than the Minimum 
Pension Goal. When the scheme with a small withdrawal rate replaces the minimum 
pension subsidy, workers with a contributory pension larger than the Minimum Pension 
Goal, but smaller than the MCPWS, begin to pay an implicit tax at rate γ in covered jobs, 
which they would not have paid it in the absence of this replacement. Thus, this group 
reduces its density of contribution. On the other hand, the low-productivity participants 
receive some subsidy under both designs. They always reduce their density of contribution, 
but do so to a greater extent with the minimum pension subsidy. Since this group is poorer, 
their utility increases are valued by more. In addition, this group should be smaller in 
number as compared to the first group. What is the balance of these considerations? the 
simulations by Slemrod et al and by Poblete give an answer: social welfare is higher in a 
scheme with a small withdrawal rate.  
 
 
5. Other policies to increase the density of contributions 
 
The model presented in this paper and the literature on optimal income taxation quoted in 
the previous section assumes that mandatory contributive pensions would be a perfect 
substitute for voluntary saving if net rates of return were equal and pension rights were    27 
alienable (Andolfatto, 2002). This assumption means that a mandate to contribute (second-
pillar) would be irrelevant in this setting, because the individual would be able to undo any 
mandate using the financial market. This assumption implies also that fiscal incentives for 
old age savings (“third pillars”) do not have a benevolent justification in this setting.   
Moreover, the best way to achieve efficient density levels in this setting is to eliminate all 
first-pillar programs (BP = 0). Concern with the lifetime poor should be addressed with a 
subsidy for all the poor, regardless of age. This is indeed the framework in which most of 
optimal income tax theory has been built. 
 
The psychology literature has amply documented the substantial prevalence of “excessive 
optimism” among individuals, which does not mean a majority is affected. An instance of 
excessive optimism is neglect of old age. This is different from the hyper rational time-
inconsistency in preferences discussed in Laibson (1997), because the latter excludes 
surprise when the high cost of old age is unveiled as excessive optimism dissipates over the 
ageing process.  
 
Neglect of old age provides benevolent justifications for second and third pillars of limited 
size (see summary in Valdés-Prieto 2002, chapters 3.3 and 3.4). Neglect of old age also 
explains concerns with low contribution densities. The positive externalities of covered 
choices are an independent justification of this concern. 
 
Neglect of old age also provides a benevolent justification for a separate noncontributory 
subsidy for the old poor, in addition to support for all the poor regardless of age, which is to 
alleviate the consequences of neglect of old age among formerly middle-class workers that 
failed to contribute enough. 
 
This section briefly outlines policies to increase density of contribution, different from 
improving the design of first-pillar subsidies. In this section neglect of old age is 
recognized as a problem that merits some (limited) State intervention. 
 
An interesting method to raise density is to allow each participant to share contributions 
with the spouse (Kotlikoff, 1997).
17 This method raises density among home workers and 
second earners in a household. This is different from allowing judges of divorce cases to 
divide pension rights between spouses, because the contribution sharing raises density and 
reduces first pillar subsidies even in the absence of divorce. Contribution sharing also has 
the advantage of operating when divorce occurs after pension age. 
 
Subsidies to contributions to the second pillar are another option to increase density. Of 
course, subsidies have fiscal costs and thus raise tax distortions or force a reduction in other 
government expenditure. In addition, such subsidies create incentives to raise density of 
contribution to socially excessive levels among those that visualize old age correctly (no 
excessive optimism). Despite this, a limited subsidy to increase density may be desirable, 
                                                 
17 Kotlikoff and Sachs (1997) propose to mandate a 50-50 split of contributions. To see why such a division 
should not be mandatory, consider a couple where she is a working nurse and he is a medical student with 
little earnings. These problems may be avoided and density may still rise if the State offers mutual division of 
contributions to all couples, subject to written approval by both members.     28 




Subsidies to contributions are delivered immediately, they are likely to be more effective 
than first-pillar subsidies, which are delivered in old age. This is because persons that 
neglect old age -are excessively optimistic- are unlikely to give much credence to the 
pessimistic event of their own poverty in old age. Persons that visualize old age correctly 
also discount the expected value of those subsidies because of iliquidity and inalienability.   
 
One problem of subsidies delivered at the time of contribution is that some of them would 
be given to individuals who subsequently accumulate above-average wealth, either because 
of luck or effort, and thus do not value the subsidy when old age arrives. 
 
Interactions with employment protection regulations, such as a relatively high minimum 
salary, must also be taken into account. When a subsidy to contributions attracts more 
individuals to covered jobs, they will not find jobs in the presence of a minimum salary. In 
this case the subsidy to contributions merely increases the unemployment rate, and the 
fiscal cost is dissipated in more search effort. This consequence can be avoided if he law 
stipulates that some share of the subsidy must be paid to the employer. This provision 
reduces the effective minimum salary. This portion of the subsidy may increase the 
employment rate of the target group or may be passed along to the workers as a higher 
contractual wage which is paid immediately. In both cases density is stimulated.
 19 
 
Another tool capable of increasing density of contribution among persons that neglect old 
age is to lighten up the mandate. When the contribution rate θ is reduced, this reduces 
( ) ) 1 ( a
ex t z − − − θ  making cases F3 and F4 more prevalent, where D* = 1. Workers that 
visualize old age correctly would still save voluntarily for old age if θ is reduced. However, 
if θ is reduced, middle-class workers that neglect old age will accumulate a smaller amount 
of pension rights, and this aspect raises the chances of old age poverty. The elasticity of 
density to θ needs to be above 1 in absolute value for this method to make sense. 
 
Another way to lighten up the mandate, proposed by Beveridge (1942, p. 139), is to exempt 
the first portion of earnings from the mandate, i.e. to make the least taxable earnings 
positive (LTE > 0; see definition in section 2.2). This approach has been applied for 
decades in the Netherlands and in Brazil. A positive LTE means that a beneficiary who 
subsequently does better than average would contribute more later in life, and this would 
exclude him from first-pillar subsidies if they are targeted. In contrast, a participant that is 
lifetime poor is allowed to consume more in the active phase, which is indeed desirable. 
This scheme provides relief when it is needed, at modest fiscal cost. This scheme also 
prevents the perverse situation where a mandate leaves a lifetime poor participant worse off 
than in the absence of all pillars (Valdés-Prieto 2002, p. 150-1). However, since a higher 
                                                 
18 The same applies to a universal flat pension that pays the same basic amount to all, since it helps alleviate 
neglect of old age of middle class persons. However, a universal flat pension also subsidizes middle class 
workers that visualized old age and saved enough voluntarily. More efficient schemes may be possible. 
19 This innovation is incorporated in the 2008 pension reform in Chile. See articles 82 to 84 of the 2008 
pension reform law (Chamber of Deputies, 2008).    29 
LTE with a given contribution rate means that the middle class worker that neglects old age 
saves a smaller amount, old age poverty looms closer, not farther. 
 
Another approach to increase density is to minimize legal exemptions from the mandate to 
contribute. These exemptions are important only for workers whose earnings are at least 
partially observed by the State. This may be the case of the self-employed who declare 
honorarium income to the tax authorities, which may be colled “formal self-employed”, but 
are legally exempt from the mandate to contribute. However, this measure would increase 
the incentives for the formal self-employed to go fully informal. 
 
In response to these concerns, Berstein, Reyes and Pino (2005) proposed the following 
default scheme: the formal self-employed would keep the option not to contribute, but the 
tax authorities would assume that they want to contribute – and would direct the statutory 
portion of declared honoraria towards the old-age individual account, drawing on the 
retention of honoraria sent by the employer – unless the participant comes forward and 
actively requests not to contribute. 
 
Fiscal incentives for voluntary old-age savings (“third pillar” programs), such as the tax 
incentives granted to IRAs, 401(k) plans and defined-benefit employer pensions in the 
United States, also contribute to increase the density of contribution.  When a country 
exhibits uneven density of contribution and major groups in the population have low 
density, the third pillar’s performance in terms of replacement rates is likely to be evaluated 
as unsatisfactory, because neglect of old age is not alleviated. Moreover, the fiscal 
incentives fail the test of vertical equity if the groups that use the incentives tend to exhibit 
higher incomes or earnings than the groups that do not use the incentives. The benevolent 
justification for the fiscal incentives dissolves.
20  
 
A design that reduces the degree of vertical inequity associated to standard tax incentives is 
to redefine the fiscal incentive as a Sate-financed matching fund for the individual’s 
contribution, at a constant rate independent of income, and subject to an absolute ceiling.
21 
A more radical approach is to define the fiscal incentive as an absolute amount per period. 
 
This section reminds us that density of contribution can be increased with a number of 
policy tools, and not just by improving the deisgn of first-pillar subsidies. 
 
 
6. Final remarks 
 
This paper offers a model where the contributory system is not mandatory, even if a 
mandate exists, because uncovered jobs are available, either legally or in practice. The 
contributory system bundles covered earnings with saving. This bundling means that job 
sector choice and saving decisions interact. In the benchmark case some individuals change 
                                                 
20 Other benevolent justifications may remain, such as avoiding the double taxation of saving associated to 
income taxes. However, restring fiscal  incentives to “retirement” saving is hard to justify with this rationale.  
21 This design was adopted in the 2008 pension reform in Chile.  See article 91 No. 13 of the 2008 pension 
reform law (Chamber of Deputies, 2008).    30 
their contribution density very significantly in response to modest perceived reversals in 
differences in the rates of return of contributory saving and pure saving vehicles. This result 
is also valid for individuals that neglect old age or suffer from the illiquidity of pension 
rights, if the effective return offered by the contributory system is enhanced by the 
productivity premium of covered jobs over uncovered jobs. 
 
The paper finds that the design of first-pillar subsidies can create those reversals. A small 
withdrawal rate minimizes reversals. Still, this withdrawal rate should not be reduced to 
zero because it is necessary to serve at the same time the fundamental goals of first-pillar 
subsidies, which is to support the old poor despite tax distortions. 
 
This paper suggests two topics for future research. One is whether the withdrawal rate 
should be the same in response to different types on income when old. One such income 
comes from mandatory pensions (second pillar), another is the one coming from tax-
favored pensions (either individual or employer-based: third pillar), a third source of 
income is comes  from pure saving, a fourth is the one coming from family transfers 
(spouses, children) and a final type of income is the one coming from labor earnings (work 
when old). The proper order of these withdrawal rates is not addressed in this paper. 
 
The second topic concerns the design of second pillars. When the State does not provide a 
universal mandate, low density ensues and the contributory system pays inadequate 
pensions relative to former earnings, and thus fails to alleviate neglect of old age.  
 
Public opinion considers low density of contribution to be a defect of the contributory 
system. In the debate that led to the 2008 reform in Chile, the argument that low density is a 
result of underdevelopment, which is associated with widespread self-employment among 
low producivity workers, was considered an excuse, since this does not solve the problem 
and rather helps preserve an unsatisfactory status quo.  
 
In a situation of low density and low contributory pensions, where some middle-income 
people fall into poverty in old age, it is tempting to introduce pay-as-you-go finance to 
grant large supplements to all the current old, including the unionized higher middle class, 
to be paid by future generations. This is part of the explanation of the widespread adoption 
of pay-as-you-go finance in countries where incomes are rising, a fact that rules out 
intergenerational insurance motives. However, pay-as-you-go grants pure subsidies to the 
initial generation and finances them with hidden taxes on the covered earnings of future 
generations, this policy reduces the efficiency of the economy (Abel et al, 1989), induces a 
decline in fertility (Cigno and Werding, 2007) and may favor populist competition in 
offering subsidies (Godoy and Valdés-Prieto, 1997). 
 
The argument that inadequate design of non-contributory subsidies is one culprit of low 
contribution density changed the scenario in the Chilean reform debate, by showing a 
constructive method to raise densities. A small withdrawal rate first-pillar strengthens 
contributory systems, as it alleviates a major failing in terms of its fundamental mission. 
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